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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper aims to investigate how ideas and socio-cultural preferences of “public” versus “private” 
account for the presence of bribery and corruption practices. Understanding corruption in terms of 
the differences that cultures attribute to what should be seen as private or public goods can provide 
new and unexpected implications not only for a general theory on this phenomenon, but more 
significantly for its high degree of variation among societies. The methodology chosen for this pa-
per is based on a quantitative analysis of ethnographic data from the Human Relations Area Files 
(HRAF) that explores the relation between types of economic subsistence and cases in which issues 
of bribery are found. The variation in how bribery is understood in different cultures does not re-
late to different moral understandings of the problem of corruption, but to how different societies 
value the difference, convertibility or blurring of goods belonging to the public and private spheres.     
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Corruption and Culture 
Quality of Government and its close cousins Good Governance and State Capacity are relatively 
new concepts that have made a strong impact in some of the highest policy circles since the mid-
1990s. The three concepts have received most attention in circles dealing with developing countries 
and the so called transition countries (Smith 2007). Especially good governance is now used by many 
national development agencies and international organisations such as the World Bank and the 
United Nations. An example is  the International Monetary Fund that in 1996 declared that "pro-
moting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the 
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a 
framework within which economies can prosper” (IMF 2008). Although these concepts refer to 
somewhat different things, they all share a focus on corruption and the need for developing coun-
tries and not only to lower their levels of corruption. This represents a major shift in focus of what 
is causing the lack of economic growth and social progress in poor countries. Before the mid-
1990s, corruption and other aspects of the quality of government was seldom talked about (Roth-
stein 2011).  The situation is now very different and since the late 1990s, one can now speak of the 
existence of an international “good governance and anti-corruption regime” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011).   
 
The development of this international anti-corruption regime has not been without its critiques. 
One point that has been stressed in this critique is that the international anti-corruption agenda 
represents a specific western liberal ideal that is not easily applicable to countries outside that part 
of the world (Heidenheimer 2002, Bukovansky 2006). There are at least two arguments against this 
type of relativistic conceptual framework. The first is normative and based on the similar discussion 
in the areas of human rights and democracy. First, the right not to be discriminated by public au-
thorities, the right not to have to pay bribes for what should be free public services and the right to 
get treat with “equal concern and respect” from the courts are in fact not very distant for what 
counts as universal human rights.  The second reason against a relativistic definition of corruption 
is empirical. Although the empirical research in this area is not entirely unambiguous, most of it 
points to the quite surprising result that people in very different cultures seem to have a very similar 
notion of what should count as corruption. Survey results from regions in India and in  Sub-
Saharan Africa show that people in these societies take a very clear stand against corruption and 
understands the problem in the same manner as it is understood by for example organizations such 
as the World Bank and Transparency International (Afrobaromter 2006, Widmalm 2005, 2008,  see 
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also Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina 2001 as well as Nichols, Siedel, and Kasdin 204;). For 
example, when asked by the Afrobarometer (2006) survey whether they consider it “not wrong at 
all,” “wrong but understandable,” or “wrong and punishable” if a public official: 1) decides to lo-
cate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters live; 2) gives a job to some-
one from his family who does not have adequate qualifications, and; 3) demands a favor or an addi-
tional payment for some service that is part of his job, a clear majority of  respondents in countries 
severely hit by corruption such as Kenya and Uganda deemed all three acts both wrong and pun-
ishable (see figure 1 below). 
FIGURE 1, (MORAL APPROVAL OF CORRUPTION) 
 
Source: (Afrobarometer 2006)  
 
As can be seen, it is only a small minority if the respondents who find that such acts “not wrong at 
all” and the group that finds them “wrong but understandable” is also small. Widmalm (2005, 2008) 
finds similar results in a survey study of  villages in India. Although, in reality an absent figure in 
these villages, Widmalm finds that the Weberian civil servant model (impartial treatment of citizens 
disregarding income, status, class, caste, gender, and religion), has a surprisingly large support 
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among the village population.   In other words, the idea put forward by among others Heidenhei-
mer (2002) that the public acceptance of what is commonly understood as corruption varies signifi-
cantly across cultures does not necessarily find support here.   
 
The reason why people, although condemning corruption, participate in corrupt practices seem to 
be that they understand the situation as a “collective action” problem where it makes little sense to 
be “the only one” that refrains from using or accepting bribes and other kick-backs (Karklins 2005, 
Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2012).  As Gunnar Myrdal stated in his analysis of the “soft state” 
problem in developing countries already in the 1960s,”Well, if everybody seems corrupt, why 
shouldn't I be corrupt” (Myrdal 1968:409). In his anthropological study of corruption in Nigeria,  
Jordan Smith (2007:65) concludes that “although Nigerians recognize and condemn, in the abstract, 
the system of patronage that dominates the allocation of government resources, in practice people 
feel locked in”.  It makes little sense to be the only honest policeman in a severely corrupt police 
force, or the only one in the village who does not pay the doctor under the table to get ones chil-
dren immunized if everyone else pays (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2012).   
In his classic study of clientelism and particularism in southern Italy, Banfield (1958) found that it 
made perfect sense to all the family in the village of Montegranesi to be amoral familists since  eve-
ryone was expected to be or eventually to perform according to this social template  (Banfield 
1958). The spatial universalism of corruption increases theoretical depth when considering that 
even temporal approaches to this phenomenon have provided similar conclusions. Analyses of 
what counted as corruption in very distant pasts, such as the Roman Empire or thirteen century 
France, give the impression of not being different from contemporary notions of the concept 
(MacMullen 1988, Jordan 2009).  
 
Another set of important empirical results that questions the relativistic position comes from recent 
comparisons of results from expert surveys and surveys of representative samples of citizens.  The 
first thing to note is that various expert-based surveys and estimations for measuring corruption 
and other theoretically related concepts of “good governance” such as the rule-of-law and the ex-
tent to which impartiality is the basic norm for the civil service in different countries, correlate at a 
surprisingly high level (Holmberg, Rothstein & Nasiritousi 2009, Rothstein & Teorell 2012). Even 
more interesting is that the expert-based measures of the level of corruption in various countries 
and measures based on representative samples of the population correlate strongly. One example is 
a recent study by Svallfors (2012) who uses the European Social Survey carried out in 2008 that 
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covers 29 countries in both western and Eastern Europe. This survey had questions such as if peo-
ple perceived that the police or the public health care gave “special advantages to certain people or 
deal with everyone equally?” Svallfors compared the answers to questions like this from the sample 
populations in the 29 countries with three different expert-based measures: the International Coun-
try Risk Guide indicator of Quality of Government, the Transparency International Corruption 
Index and the World Bank Estimate of Government Efficiency. His conclusion is the following: 
“we find amazingly strong correlations between the experts’ judgments and the public’s percep-
tions. The correlation coefficient is no less than 0.81, which indicates that the measures are very 
strongly interrelated”. This strongly suggests that perception of corruption correlates with percep-
tion of good government, and by extension that judgment on the quality of the political and admin-
istrative institutions are not seen as a particularistic product. 
 
Another similar comparison has been done by Bechert and Quandt based on the International So-
cial Survey Programme (ISSP). In its 2006 survey, the ISSP for the first time included questions 
that would measure the extent of perceptions of corruption. Comparing the results from 35 coun-
tries, including not only the West but also the countries in Eastern Europe. Africa, Asia and South  
America, with Transparency Internationals expert based measure of corruption, they conclude: 
“The two measurement tools of corruption, one based on expert interviews, the other on probabil-
ity samples, reveal astonishingly similar results” (Bechert & Quandt 2009:100). Yet another recent 
survey of corruption carried out by the QoG Institute on behalf of the EU commission reveals the 
same pattern. This study consisted of interviews with 34000 persons in 27 EU countries and has 
question to not only capture perceptions but also direct experiences of corruption. Again, the cor-
relation between results about the level of corruption in various EU countries from the survey of 
“ordinary people” and expert based measures are surprisingly similar with a statistical correlation at 
.81 (Charron, Lapuente & Rothstein 2011).  The conclusion from these results are that “ordinary 
people” in both high and low corrupt countries have the same perceptions and also experience the 
same level of corruption as the international country experts. In sum, there are both empirical and 
normative arguments speaking in favor of a universal definition of corruption.  
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The public goods approach  
One way to understand why there seems to exist a universal understanding of what should count as 
corruption despite its enormous variation both in types, frequency and location, is what we would 
call a public goods approach to this problem. In all societies/cultures, in order to survive, all groups of 
people have had to produce at least a minimal set of public goods such as security measures, a basic 
infrastructure or organized/collective forms for the provision of food. As Fukuyama (2011:29ff) 
has argued, the very idea that we as humans started out as atoms in a state of nature and then de-
cided to rationally accept a “social contract” is highly misleading. On the other hand, Malkin and 
Wildavsky (1991) developed the proposition that public goods are public only because it is the soci-
ety that makes them so to some particular aim (see also Mansfield 1980; Douglas 1989). In our view 
this approach is feeding relativism over ideas of quality of government or good government. In this 
paper we are less interested to explore the significance of the public-private divide for societies than 
to investigate how the socio-cultural creation of ideas of “public” versus “private” accounts for the 
presence of bribery and corruption practices.     
 
The very nature of a good being “public” is that it is to be managed and distributed according to a 
principle that is very different from that of private goods. When this principle for the management 
and distribution of public goods is broken by those entrusted with the responsibility for handling 
the public goods, the ones that are victimized see this as corruption. This is why corruption is a 
concept that is related to the political and not the private sphere. Much of the confusion about 
cultural relativism in the discussion about what should count as corruption stems from the issue 
that what should count as “public goods” differ between different societies and cultures. For ex-
ample, in an absolutist feudal country where the understanding may be that the central state appa-
ratus is the private property of the lord/king, this state is not seen as a public good. In many indig-
enous societies with pre-state political systems, local communities have usually produced some 
forms of public goods, for example for taking care of what Elinor Ostrom (1990) defined as 
“common pool resources” which are natural resources that are used by members of the group but 
that risks depletion if overused. Such resources is constantly faced a “tragedy of the commons” 
problem and is thus in need of public goods in the form of effective regulations to prevent overuse 
leading to depletion.   Our argument departs from the idea that it is difficult to envision a society 
without some public goods. The point is that when these public goods are handled or converted 
into private goods this is universally understood as corruption independently of the culture. A sec-
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ond conclusion is thus that we should not expect, for instance indigenous people to have a moral 
or ethical understanding corrupt practice that differs from for example what is the dominant view 
in western organizations like Transparency International and the World Bank or as it is stated in the 
UN convention against corruption. Instead, what may differ is what is seen as falling under the 
public goods category. An example could be that even in the case in which there is not a system for 
taxation, still there are certain individuals that have been selected to perform functions as arbitra-
tors or judges. This is a public good because it makes it possible to solve disputes between village 
members/families in a non-violent way. These arbitrators may, in several cases,  receive gifts from 
the parties involved for their services. Such gifts may for a westerner look like bribes, but they are 
usually not seen as bribes by the local people, who  make a functional distinction between bribes 
and gifts (Sneath 2006; Werner 2000).  The reasons for why they are not seen as bribes by the local 
villagers is that:  a)  the gifts are publicly given, and b) there is a culturally defined  level for how big 
such gift can be.  This implies that the gift is to be seen as a fee for a service, not a bribe. It would 
only be a bribe, and would also by the local people be seen as a bribe, if it was given in a way to 
influence adjudication by favoring one party over another. In this case the public good is converted 
into a private one, and this is perceived as corruption. 
 
Understanding corruption in this public goods approach can thus serve as a solution to the relativ-
ism – universalism puzzle that has plagued discussions about this problem for a long time, especial-
ly in the lights of anthropological reservations on applying the dichotomies public-private, moral-
immoral. 
The anthropological approaches to corruption 
Anthropologists have not yet taken a decisive and single position towards the ethnographic study of 
corruption. Roughly speaking there are two main standpoints. The first is of engagement with the 
topic, the second is of suspicion towards it (Smith 2007:9ff; Zinn 2005). Concerning the first, there 
has been since the 1990s a stream of ethnographical research that has dealt, directly or not, expres-
sively or not, with corruption. This research has been mostly focusing on postcolonial and post-
socialist states, with some notable exceptions (Pardo 2004; Rivkin-Fish 2004), not because anthro-
pology has aimed to essentialize the phenomenon by ascribing it to the domain of institutional 
restructuring, aid-receiving economies and post-totalitarian governments. Rather, this regional bias 
depends on the fact that anthropologists have more commonly conducted ethnographic fieldwork 
in these regions rather than in western countries. Moreover, among these approaches, there is not 
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such a thing as a common theoretical framework or modeling, but a complex web of arguments, 
approaches and insights that sometimes intertwine or overlap one another, but mostly show a high 
degree of particularism (Torsello 2011). Therefore, to a non-anthropologist, the results of ethno-
graphic approaches to corruption, may apparently seem rather relativistic and poorly helpful for 
theoretical and policy aims.  
 
The second, and most common position among anthropologists towards the study of corruption is 
one of suspicion or simply detachment (Harris 2002). A simple proof to this statement comes from 
the reality that over the last two decades the number of panels on corruption in major anthropolog-
ical societies’ conferences can be counted on a single hand. Not better is the case of volume publi-
cations in anthropology that deals expressively with corruption, amounting over the last four dec-
ades to less than a dozen. There are different explanations to this shortcoming. Here it is sufficient 
to refer to two of them. First, corruption is a complex phenomenon which, in everyday practices, is 
inextricably tied with numerous other forms of social interaction, such as, for instance: gift, reci-
procity, friendship, kin ties, patronage, identity, affection and even love. Anthropologists, who have 
been traditional engaging through ethnographic research with most of these themes in societies, 
might have discovered corruption more by chance than by directly looking for it among these 
themes. Moreover,  an ethnographic research focus on corruption per se brings about a number of 
epistemic questions concerning the authority of the ethnographer, her taking a moral standpoint in 
judging about the observed practices and their moral, and the confrontation between the ethnog-
rapher and the studied socio-cultural differences. All these arehighly problematic issues that have in 
recent times been challenged by those scholars advocating the reflexive turn in anthropology 
(Faubion and Marcus 2009) 
 
Secondly, the way ethnographic research is conducted, through direct interaction with the observed 
community, opens up a number of questions and dilemmas about the ethical conduct of the re-
searcher. As stated in one anthropological study of corruption: “Anthropology’s emphasis on local 
rationalities and cultural logics, and the largely sympathetic sensibility of anthropologists regarding 
their subjects, may produce a disinclination to attach a seemingly derogatory Western label like 
corruption to the behavior of non-Western people” (Smith 2007:10, cf. Shore and Haller 2005:7).  
Because of the sensitive nature of the topic, writing about corruption as an observed practice, or 
simply as opinion about a diffuse practice may significantly expose informants. The outcome is that 
ethnographers’ accounts seem to disappoint the expectations of those who would like to read first-
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hand local encounters with corruption. This hesitation to describe squarely what is taking place on 
the field is what makes the ethnographic approach to corruption a somewhat hermetic one, but 
nonetheless potentially innovative.  
 
This paper stems from the idea that ethnographic knowledge has an intrinsic strong and often hid-
den potential to disentangle the social and cultural complexity of corruption, in particular concern-
ing the universalism-particularism puzzle. To this aim, we aim to demonstrate, taking the example 
of indigenous cultures studied by anthropologists, that one of the main reasons why universalism 
and particularism persist in this phenomenon is that what are seen as private and public goods  has 
a high degree of variation  among different cultures.  Our argument is that it is this variation, and 
not the moral understanding of corruption as such, that creates an imbalance in what we under-
stand as corruption in different cultures.  In other words, when a good that is perceived as a public 
good is used in a culture as a private good this action is condemned as a moral wrong. The varia-
tion in what is understood as corruption lies in the variation in what counts as (and the extension 
of) public goods in the cultures, and not in a variation if it is morally wrong to turn a public goods 
into a private good. Hence, our hypothesis is that in a culture in which the private and public goods 
are neatly separated both conceptually and customarily, i.e. in their access and management, will 
have less fear of corruption. On the other hand, corruption will be a relevant issue whenever the 
private and public goods overlap or are easily converted by those who have access to them.  
Methodology 
The methodology chosen for this paper is based on a quantitative analyses of ethnographic data 
from a unique source, namely the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF). This is the single most 
comprehensive and largest ethnographic dataset of world indigenous cultures. The HRAF database  
has been compiled by Yale University and it has been developed and updated since 1949. It in-
cludes data on 258 indigenous cultures and an overall of over 600,000 pages worth of ethnographic 
descriptions by professional anthropologists, (and in minor parts by archaeologists and historians). 
The cultures covered are divided among 8 world regions (Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle America and 
the Caribbean, Middle East, North America, Oceania and South America) and these are further 
divided in a number of sub-regions. The complex and recently much improved searchable indexing 
system of HRAF allows researchers to obtain detailed, qualitative ethnographic information on a 
single culture, as well as analyzing keywords cross-culturally. Ethnographic files are present in the 
form of full-text citations as paragraphs dealing with a specific theme, which are comparatively 
 11 
arranged through sub-themes or related topics depending on their relevance in the ethnographies in 
which they appear.  
Another important feature of HRAF is that it maps indigenous cultures according to a classification 
of major forms of subsistence and types of economic activity. The standard nine such forms are as 
follow: 
Foragers: cultures that depend for subsistence at least 85% on hunting, fishing and gathering 
Foragers/food producers: depend 56% or more on hunting, fishing and gathering, but also pro-
duce food 
Pastoralists: depend 56% or more on herding and animal husbandry 
Horticulturalists: depend 56% or more on simple agriculture (extensive or horticulture) 
Intensive agriculturalists: depend 56% or more on intensive, irrigated agriculture 
Pastoral/agriculturalists: where pastoralism and agriculture/horticulture provide 76% or more of 
the economic activity 
Other: including other combinations of the above 
Commercial economy: gaining from wages, business or selling products 
Not assigned: information is missing or controversial 
For the purpose of this article we decided to select four categories of subsistence forms: foragers 
(including both foragers and foragers/food producers), pastoralists and horticulturalists.  For the 
fourth, we created a “dummy” category that includes all the economic forms above (excluding “not 
assigned”) based on agriculture and commercial economy. This choice is grounded on the idea  that 
we want to test differences between cultures which mainly produce for their own subsistence ver-
sus cultures which mainly produce for market based exchange or other commercial purposes. This 
difference has been shown to be very relevant for other types of economic behavior exposed in 
experimental research carried out in a collaborative project between anthropologists and econo-
mists (Henrich et. al. 2005, Henrich et al 2010)  
 
Our choice of dealing with various indigenous cultures has some shortcomings and some ad-
vantages. Concerning the minuses, the sample of cultures divided among forms of economic activi-
ty is not balanced. For example, foragers are the least represented subsistence type among the three 
in the HRAF database. This implies that we in particular cases have to rely on very small numbers 
within the overall HRAF sample. Moreover, the type of data which makes up HRAF are mostly 
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qualitative, hence our task has been to code forms in which anthropologists have described corrup-
tion-related ideas and practices. There will be an obvious bias towards the personal judgment of the 
ethnographer who provided the data and who might have used a word or analyzed a practice in a 
context in which local people would have given to that a different interpretation, as it is normally 
confronted with in ethnographic research (Clifford and Marcus 1986).  
 
The benefits of this methodology are first of all the unique opportunity to investigate corruption in 
some societies that, at the time of the ethnographic researches, were still partially insulated from the 
effects of globalization, mass-consumption and industrialization. This is particularly true for those 
groups which perform a prevalently subsistence type of economy (foragers, horticulturalists and to 
a lesser extent pastoralists). Secondly, most of these societies present much higher degrees of social 
homogeneity than any sample of cross-cultural world survey may claim to reach. Thirdly, since we 
have assumed that corruption is a universal phenomenon (because it is the product of a wrongly 
positioned or assumed balanced between public and private goods), there is no reason to suppose 
that any indigenous culture should not recognize this phenomenon. Instead, investigation in their 
social realities can provide a significant contribution to a deeper understanding of the particularism 
versus universalism puzzle in corruption research.  
Bribery across indigenous cultures 
In spite of the numerous potential application of HRAF database, and in spite of the volume of 
scholarly works that use its data, this is, as far as we know, the first attempt ever to quantitatively 
analyze indigenous cultures in the field of corruption. In what follows we shall, first, define the 
context in which corruption has been searched over the files. Secondly, we shall map quantitatively 
corruption that is found through the keyword “bribe” across world regions and economic systems 
and detect the dominant trends. Third, we shall apply these trends to the differences in subsistence 
and economic activity types. 
In the HRAF files, bribery and corruption are present in five items: evasion of justice1 (code num-
ber: 696), offense against the state2 (687), exploitation by political office holders3 (661), political 
                                                     
1 Defined in HRAF as: “Manner in which judgments and sentences are executed (e.g., self-help, execution by special officials); 
enforcement of contracts and debts; writs (e.g., of execution, attachment, replevin); probation; evasions of justice (e.g., procedural 
loopholes, bribery, flight, asylum); etc”. 
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intrigue4 (662) and corruption as political machines5 (667). Due to the complexity of the task of 
attributing corruption to the political spheres of governance and administration of the societies 
under investigations, a number of which do not have structured and centralized political state-like 
systems, we have decided to keep all these five denominations that account for corruption. This 
operation allows us to include several fields that, in common political theory, are not directly related 
to governance and corruption, but which in the ethnographic descriptions by anthropologists ap-
pear with the term “bribe”. This rationale follows the idea that in different cultural, and particularly 
indigenous, settings while conceptions of a distinction between private and public goods exist, the 
factual division of them do not coincide with those of the Western or industrialized societies (Hal-
ler and Shore 2005, Nujiten and Anders 2007). Moreover, in order to optimize the search efficacy, 
instead of “corruption”, we chose to use  the keyword “bribe”, which, fortunately, accounts for 
both its nominal  and verbal form “bribery”. 
Bribery has different meanings in the analyzed files and the interpretation of these meanings, as 
well as of the fields to which they pertain, has been one of the aims of this research. Of course, 
there have been cases in which it was difficult to detect a singular semiotic of bribery, because the 
action or the opinion referred to multiple fields (e.g. judicial system and litigation settlements over 
property issues). In these cases, the main field has been indicated and other fields were added only 
if there was a clear multiple expression of the domain to which bribery pertained. The only case in 
which the word bribery was not taken into account was its general use as form of gift that induces a 
person to make a decision or perform an action without any clear benefit for the briber. Such cases 
have been classified as “other”. On the other hand, there are cases in which bribery is found in 
                                                                                                                                                           
2
 “Definitions, incidence of, and punishments for political offenses (e.g., treason, espionage, illegal entry, conspiracy, lese majesty, 
electoral fraud, malfeasance in office); penalties for military offenses (e.g., insubordination, cowardice, desertion, mutiny); defini-
tions of and punishments for judicial offenses (e.g., giving or receiving bribes, perjury, subornation, barratry, contempt of court); 
penalties for monetary or fiscal offenses (e.g., counterfeiting, falsification of records or documents, smuggling, tax evasion); etc”. 
3
 “Exercise of their power by holders of political office to further personal goals, whether materialistic, psychological, or ideologi-
cal; perquisites of office (e.g., exceptional income and material comforts, special sexual or marital privileges, unusual honors or 
deference); use of office for self-aggrandizement (e.g., exhibitionism, extortion of bribes, protection of vice, acceptance of commis-
sions for services rendered); employment of power to force others to conform to personal, ethical, or religious convictions; suppres-
sion of rivals (e.g., purges); oppression of opponents; nepotism; protection of vested interests; etc”. 
4
 “Use of the techniques of manipulative mobility to wrest favors from the holders of power or to obtain political preferment; 
flattery and ingratiation; use of bribery; deals; palace intrigue; opportunism; "playing politics";etc”. 
5
 “Special organizations for the control of elections and offices and the distribution of spoils; personal and party machines; rewards 
to members and controlled voters (e.g., jobs, contracts, favors, police protection, petty graft); mechanisms of mobility within the 
machine (e.g., ward heeling, getting out the vote); relations with the underworld; extent of political corruption; attempts at reform; 
etc”. 
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literary (tales, drama and dance), or in mythological texts. Here the field was added when the act of 
bribing expressively involved an asymmetric relationship such as between a master and client, a god 
and a worshipper, a god and a human being, particularly in the field “religion”. 
The following are the categories or fields of bribery which we coded after the HRAF advanced 
search, with the subcategories that they contain. 
Judicial: including police and military 
Local Administration: including elections, land allotments, taxation, opinions and media, foresters 
and postal services 
Colonial domination: considered as external forms of administration 
Infrastructures: includes education, health and transport 
Gifts: includes debt 
Marriage: relates to all transactions that accompany marriage links 
Religion: includes all religious and magic practices with supernatural powers, as well as mythologi-
cal figures 
Interethnic Relations: expressively related to interethnic relations and migration 
Private Sector: includes commercial transactions 
Leisure: with art, culture and prostitution 
Other: indefinable categories, usually when bribery does not mean any kind of social relation or 
transaction. 
 
Private and public good in the economic activity types 
Cultural anthropologists have developed an evolutionary model that draws a line among the interre-
lation of four key aspects in human society: ecological adaptation, forms of subsistence, demo-
graphic pressure and socio-political organizations (for a comprehensive review and trends of this 
approach see Johnson and Earle 2000). In this perspective, the three subsistence types considered 
above (foraging, horticulturalism and pastoralism) are the pristine forms of human subsistence out 
of which all other forms of economic activity eventually have evolved (see table 1 below). For the 
first, the activity of hunters-gatherers, it has been assumed that man has acted as forager for 96% of 
his existence on earth. For the historical origin of the other two there is more ambiguity in the liter-
ature. Apart from the evolutionary question whether man has domesticated plants or animals first, 
the problem is that there exists no single culture in which one of these two forms of domestication 
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have completely excluded the other. This explains why, if in the case of foragers an approximation 
of 85% of dedication to hunting and gathering is possible, horticulturalists and pastoralists societies 
never engage by  more than 56% in their main subsistence activity. This consideration has some 
important implications for the public-private good argument. Anthropologists who have engaged 
with the “tragedy of the commons argument” (Hardin 1968) have accepted some of its conclusions, 
particularly the “limited good” perspective, indicating the probability of degradation of open-access 
resources (Foster 1963, Feeny et al. 1990). This is the case of pastoralism which, in the 1970s, was 
extensively seen in relationship with desertification processes and called for world-scale develop-
ment projects intervening on what was at the core of Hardin’s argument: private good seeking 
herders were increasing their flocks causing publicly perceived (open access) grazing land to de-
crease sharply in several world regions (Fratkin 1997). However, the main flaw with Hardin’s argu-
ment was with the assumption that the actual division between public and a private good is per-
ceived similarly across cultures, an argument which to most anthropologists is untenable. In several 
and different socio-cultural conditions, ethnographic evidence has demonstrated that local concepts 
of what should count as the public and the private spheres have been, first, historically determined 
(for the postsocialist transformation of property rights, see Hann et al. 2002). Secondly,  this can 
depend on the types of good (James 2005), and also on the social, economic and political features 
of the groups who develop them. Hence, in order to propose a solution to this particularism, we 
have decided to follow a different approach, which do not start from the notions of what is usually 
seen as public and private goods in Western societies. Instead, we use a classifications of economic 
subsistence types formulated by anthropologists to generalize the socio-political features of pre-
industrial societies and then we relate them to the public-private divide.  
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TABLE 1, (SUBSISTENCE AND ECONOMIC FORMS AND MOST COMMON SOCIO-POLITICAL AR-
RANGEMENTS) 
 
Subsistence/Economic 
Activity 
Social level Political arrange-
ment 
Public vs. private 
good cultural 
preferences 
Foragers Band Acephalous, authori-
ty of elders 
Preference towards 
publicly managed 
goods, few private 
goods 
Horticulturalists Kin group Kin group leader, 
chiefdom 
Private and public 
goods often con-
vertible, redistribu-
tion as power strat-
egy 
Pastoralism Clan Tribal or segment 
leader 
Private and public 
goods are strictly 
defined and sepa-
rated 
Agriculturalist/Commercial 
economy 
Village Territorial admin-
istration 
No traceable pref-
erences  
 
Foragers 
Foragers have societies in which  real power holders are commonly not officially recognized. These 
groups live in small bands with semi- or fully nomadic character. Because of the importance they 
attribute to social harmony, sharing goods and avoiding conflicts is important.  Instead ideas of 
reciprocity dominate economic behavior and the pursuit of private gain is avoided or kept secret 
because it is perceived as endangering the delicate collaborative structure of the band. In the 1960s 
these groups, who were facing worldwide dramatic population decrease and had become mostly 
confined to remote and extremely unproductive areas, were defined “affluent societies” 
(Sahlins1972). This idea was based on the custom that all caught game and most of gathered plants 
were to be shared among all community members, including those who for various reasons had not 
participated in hunting or gathering of plants. This, in spite of the recent environmental and popu-
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lation changes, suggests that while the private/public goods dimension exists for foragers, the di-
chotomy has for this group the least importance because the cultural emphasis is on maintaining 
common access to the means of subsistence and the goods in question are is  thus seen as public 
goods (Myers 1988; Ingold, Riches and Woodburn 1988; Burch and Ellanna 1996). This finding is 
confirmed by the quantitative experimental study on cooperation patterns that used simulation 
games over a number of indigenous populations and found that foragers scored the highest in the 
cooperative behavior thus, proving a general cultural predisposition towards  seeing goods as public 
instead of  private (Henrich et al. , 2005, 2010).  
 
Horticulturalists 
Horticulturalist societies practice technologically simple forms of agriculture. They prevalently live 
in tropical settings (Melanesia, Polinesia, Southeastern Asia and South America in the Amazonian 
regions) where they clear forest land for short periods and often switch to other land once cultiva-
tion has become unproductive. Unlike intensive agriculturalists, they don’t have easily definable 
forms of private property and their living contiguously to tropical forests or highlands makes them 
unable to set clear boundaries and fences. Nonetheless, disputes over access to private goods are 
very common and abundant. Ethnographic research have shown these to be among the most bel-
ligerent groups among the three basic subsistence types (Richerson 2001). Horticulturalists live 
mainly in family or extended-kin social structures with leaders that can be appointed or belong to 
ruling kin groups. This is the subsistence type to which the famous figure of the Melanesian “Big 
Man”, a charismatic leader who is elected by his people and maintains power thanks to a proper 
balance of personalistic networks and prestige, is attributed (Carrier 1992; Keesing 2002). Sahlins 
(1963) has characterized the Melanesian “Big Man” as an individual who is able to manage goods 
through redistribution and ostentation, who obtains such goods through marriage (often polyga-
mous) and alliances and invest them back through collective feasts and banquets in order to main-
tain public support. One might say that notions of public and private goods are mutually converti-
ble as the Big Man reconfigures them to remain competitive and maintain legitimacy. A further 
confirmation to this is that in the aforementioned game theory experiments horticulturalist people 
scored the least in terms of tendency towards cooperative behavior which we interpret as privileg-
ing private over public control of goods (Henrich et al., 2005, 2010). 
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Pastoralists 
Among the three subsistence groups, pastoralists are the one to have a clear-cut definition of the 
public and private spheres but with a clearly marked tendency to value the latter. The idea of pri-
vate good is easily possessed and communicated in these societies where material wealth (land and 
animals) mark social differences. However, the delineation of public goods is more problematic in 
these societies for a number of reasons. Pastoralist societies have often political structures that keep 
together different clans or lineages, sometimes in the form of segments, i.e. territorially based kin-
ship groups or clan sub-units. These societies may or may not have strong leaders, but due to their 
corporate structure leaders are not able to rule without the (nearly) full support of the segments or 
tribes, and mainly of the elders. In this perspective, the pursuit of public goods is not only funda-
mental to the practice of herding, but it is strategic for maintaining inter-clan cohesion thanks to a 
number of arrangements to share grazing land (Livingstone 1986; Blewett 1995; Fratkin 1997; Tay-
lor 2005). As could be expected, in the aforementioned experimental studies, pastoralist societies’ 
scores for cooperation were intermediate between foragers and horticulturalists (Henrich et al. 
2004: 14-15, 2005, 2010).  
Finally, we assume that agriculture (intensive or extensive) practiced with more technologically 
advanced techniques and implying a more clearly  defined concept of private property has a differ-
ent effect on the partition of private versus public goods. Compared to the previous three subsist-
ence forms, the factual extension of what should count as public goods is one that needs to be 
negotiated and defined differently for each agricultural or commercial economies.  For instance it 
may be in the form of common grazing lands where herders are present. I can also be in the form 
of cooperative food processing plants, structures for irrigation or as shared crops among commer-
cial producers.  
 
Bribery among world indigenous cultures 
The HRAF database shows that the word “bribe” has been found in 113 cultures which is 48% of 
the whole HRAF sample when European countries are excluded.  The number of documents on 
which the term has been detected is 234, with a total of 375 entries. The geographical distribution is 
described in Table 2. 
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Table 2, (BRIBERY AMONG WORLD INDIGENOUS CULTURSE) 
Africa Asia America Oceania Total  
27 33 42 11 113 
Source: (HRAF elaboration) 
The regional distribution according to forms of economic activity is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3, (SUBSISTENCE TYPES AND WORLD DISTRIBUTION)  
 Africa Asia America Oceania Total 
      
Foragers 2 1 11 1 15 
Horticulturalists 8 3 9 4 24 
Pastoralists 2 5 0 0 7 
Agriculturalists/Commercial 
Economy 15 24 22 6 67 
TOTAL 27 33 42 11 113 
Source: (HRAF elaboration) 
From these tables emerge two findings. The first is that there is not a wide difference among the 
three largest continents: Africa, Asia (including the Middle East) and America. What is striking is 
perhaps the third place occupied by African countries and the first by the countries on the Ameri-
can continent (including both Northern and Southern America). Oceanian cultures in HRAF are 
fewer and this explains the comparatively smaller number of cases in which bribery has been de-
tected there.   
More illuminating is the finding about economic or subsistence forms. As expected from our theo-
ry, the category agriculturalists/commercial economy contains the largest number of bribery entries 
in the ethnographic material. This supports the thesis that corruption is widely spread where public 
and private arrangements for the use of and access to resources and goods can be expected to vary 
a lot. Even more interesting is our finding that pastoralist societies are apparently the least exposed 
to corruption among the subsistence types. This also supports our theory since it is in this econom-
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ic type of society that we should expect to find the least ambiguity between private goods (herds 
and land) and public  goods.  
The subsistence form in which bribery is most present is horticulture. Here, as assumed above, the 
distinction private-public is problematic for two reasons: the precarious access to economic re-
sources and the shaky basis of political authority, which is highly contextual and strongly dependent 
on social rather than economic capital. Finally, foragers score a mid-range position. This finding is 
rather surprising, considering the neat orientation of these cultures towards public rather than pri-
vately-accessible goods. Moreover the fact that most of the foragers in which bribery was found are 
from the American continent suggests that before drawing any conclusion on this point it is neces-
sary to introduce the distinction among fields in which bribery has been detected by ethnographers. 
The fields of bribery     
Table 4 summarizes the findings in the fields of bribery in the economic activities. 
 
Table 4, (FIELDS OF BRIBERY AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY FORMS)  
  Foragers Horticulturalists Pastoralists Agriculturalists      Total 
Judicial 2 10 4 75 91 
Local Administration 2 16 2 61 81 
Religion 5 5 1 38 49 
Gifts 1 8 4 27 40 
Private Sector 3 1 0 22 26 
Marriage 2 0 2 18 22 
Colonial Administrat-
ion 6 0 0 15 21 
Infrastructures 3 2 0 14 19 
Interethnic Relations 2 1 0 11 14 
Leisure 0 0 0 4 4 
Other 0 0 0 8 8 
Source: (HRAF elaboration) 
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Reading of this table is a more complex endeavor. The most evident outcome is the overall domi-
nance of bribery in the judicial field, in 91 cases on 375 (it must be stressed that the number of 
cases is three time as that of the other cultures, because in many cultures there are more cases in 
which the word bribery is mentioned), followed by the field “local administration” with 81 entries. 
If one sums these two with the items “colonial administration” and “infrastructures”, which make 
roughly the standard categories through which quality of government is assessed worldwide, the 
overall counts amount to 212, which makes 56.5% of the all circumstances in which bribery has 
been used for describing HRAF cultures. This is alone a demonstration that corruption is to be 
seen as a universal phenomenon, with the same features for more than half of the cases treated in 
this paper. However, the remaining 43.5% is interesting too, since it includes fields that belong 
mostly to the social rather than political field, such as gifts, marriage, religion and inter-group rela-
tions. 
Looking at the breakdown for subsistence types it is possible to map some trends that relate to our 
general theory about the private and public access (or perceived access) to goods. First, it is inter-
esting to notice that most of the cases in which the term bribery was found in foraging cultures 
refer to cases from native societies in Northern America. Being that  these are societies that faced 
more violence acculturation from the European colonizers, this may suggests that in foraging socie-
ties the imbalance between public and private good has been introduced through external forces 
and it is not an endogenous process related to political administration. A second confirmation 
comes from the fact that foragers have the highest (still only 3 cases) score of “private sector” brib-
ery among the three subsistence economic systems, when foragers do not traditionally have forms 
of commercial economy. It is a sign that external trade (as in the case of European colonizers of 
Native American lands) has intervened to put accent on the importance of private goods.  
Secondly, horticulturalists and agriculturalists, with the due proportional differences, show similar 
trends: the judicial and the local administration are the most common fields in which the world 
bribery has been encountered, although in inverted fashion, where local administration has more 
counts than judicial bribery for horticulturalists. The subsequent importance, in rank of gifts, fol-
lowed by religion, suggest that forms of bribery related to social exchange and reciprocity (most of 
religious forms of bribery are those defined as offers to chiefs and religious specialists as shamans 
and sorcerers) are also important. These trends suggest that horticulturalists  have problems similar 
to those faced by agriculture and commerce based economic systems, i.e. corruption that is affected 
by the blurring of private and public spheres. 
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Thirdly, the case of pastoralists is a remarkable one in which bribery is almost absent. This subsist-
ence type scores with only 7 world cultures, the majority of which is located in Central Asia, and 13 
documented cases in which the word bribery is used. Also the distinction among fields does not 
provide hints on particular trends, where the judicial and gifts score at the same level (4 cases each) 
followed by local administration and marriage (2 cases each). The numbers are too small to make 
any generalization, however, the idea exposed above that this constitute the subsistence type which 
is the least exposed to corruption due to its clear distinction between private and public goods that 
is at the core of its economic strategies. This is also is supported by the fact that there is no field in 
which corruption stands as more evident than others. 
Finally, the case of agriculturalists/commercial economy types of culture present a more balanced 
picture in which bribery appears for about 55% of the cases in the field of politics, 32% in forms of 
social exchange and 13% in commercial and other transactions. This composition makes up an 
allegedly fair picture of the incidence of corruption in industrial societies as well, even though the 
content of single fields can change or assume different denominations. 
Conclusion 
Understanding corruption in terms of the differences that cultures attribute to what should be seen 
as private or public goods can provide new and unexpected implications not only for a general 
theory on this phenomenon, but more significantly for its high degree of variation among societies. 
Our findings support our argument that corruption is a phenomenon that is universally understood 
in a similar manner across different cultures. The variation in how it is understood in different cul-
tures does not relate to different moral understandings of the problem of corruption but to how 
different societies come to understand and value the difference between public and private goods 
and also what most people expect that most other people in their society will do when faced with 
opportunities for bribery. The use of the world largest sample of ethnographic material on indige-
nous societies may appear an unusual approach to deal with this phenomenon that has commonly 
been associated with imperfect democracies, inefficient market economies or authoritarian regimes. 
On the other hand, the persistence and resistance of corruption to definitive solutions in both time 
and space is itself a demonstration of the universality of this phenomenon, as well as of the percep-
tion of its harms to social well-being. Anthropology has long largely remained silent on the study of 
corruption, and its contributions have often been considered relativistic in nature, and hence inca-
pable to contribute to modeling and policy making. In this study, however, we have demonstrated 
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that drawing on one of the few fields in which anthropological knowledge has downplayed the 
universalism-particularism puzzle, namely the relationship between ecological adaptation and socio-
political organizations, it is possible to define and analyze corruption through cultural attributes. 
Our analysis support the claim that these attributes pertain to the sphere of how a social group 
meaningfully distinguish, interrelate and convert goods between the private and public domains.     
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